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Jack N. Rakove*
In the pantheon of American history, John Bingham is something
less than a household name. Even the most engaged citizens whom
Bruce Ackerman wants to mobilize for higher lawmaking would be
strapped to identify him, and one wonders how many law students or
graduate students in history would do any better! Akhil Amar
* The author is the Coe Professor of History and American Studies at Stanford University,
where he has taught since 1980. His edition of James Madison: Writings will be published by
the Library of America in 1999.
1. Bingham was a Republican congressman from Ohio who served on the 15-member Joint
Committee on Reconstruction which was the principal engine for framing congressional
reconstruction policy in the Thirty-ninth Congress. Bingham is widely credited as the principal
author of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. The fact that his name does not appear
in the index of the first two standard American history textbooks I consulted for reference
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concludes his new book with a proposal to elevate Bingham to a
niche near the exalted place occupied by the familiar personage who
lies closer to my own historian's and biographer's heart: James
Madison, leading framer of the Federal Constitution and Bill of
Rights. For in Amar's telling, Bingham's role in framing the
Fourteenth Amendment made possible the eventual transformation
in the meaning of the Bill of Rights that has been so conspicuous a
feature of modern constitutional jurisprudence. While "Madison did
believe in strong individual rights.., he was ahead of his time" in
doing so, and "the nauseous project" of amendments that he forced
down the throats of a reluctant Congress in 1789 proved far more
federal than liberal in both its enactment and interpretation 2 -that is,
it was far more concerned with limiting national power and
protecting the autonomy of the states than with establishing a robust
list of individual rights (or privileges and immunities) to be protected
against all forms of governmental abuse. That interpretation of the
original meaning of the Bill of Rights was sanctified by the Supreme
Court in Barron v. Baltimore.3 But it was to reverse the doctrine of
Barron that Bingham rallied his fellow Republicans of the Thirty-
ninth Congress (or Convention Congress, to use an Ackernym).
A concern with such major transformations in the constitutional
order is one theme that ties the most recent books of this Yale Law
School tag-team of Amar and Ackerman together; another is their
common conviction that the formal amendment procedures of
Article V do not exhaust the actual mechanisms by which such
fundamental changes have been (Ackerman) or may be (Amar)
effected. Both books illustrate the marked turn toward history-
especially the history of politics and institutions-that seems so
conspicuous a feature of contemporary legal scholarship as well as of
social science.! Both books are substantially (though only partly)
historical in character; for the essence of the historian's enterprise is
the explanation of change -including transformative change-rather
when the editors of this journal pressed me for a further identification illustrates the depths of
his undeserved obscurity. For the record, the texts in question are THE AMERICAN PEOPLE:
CREATING A NATION AND A SOCIETY (Gary Nash et al. eds., 3d ed. 1994); and A NATION
AMONG NATIONS: A NARRATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (James West
Davidson et al. eds., 1990).
2. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 291
(1998); Letter from James Madison to Richard Peters (Aug. 19, 1789), in 12 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 346 (R. Rutland ed., 1979).
3. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that the restrictions on government power in the Bill
of Rights constrain only the national government, not the states).
4. Curiously, this resurgence is occurring at a time when many political historians are
grumbling about the seeming marginality of their traditional interests to the dominant agenda
of contemporary historical scholarship. For a description of this general phenomenon, see THE
HISTORIC TURN IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES (Terrence J. McDonald ed., 1996).
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than the archaeological recovery of artifacts and mores, or the simple
narration of events. And both books evince a reasonably informed
engagement with the requisite historical monographs and syntheses.
Having made these concessions, a working historian should
immediately interject that it is by no means evident what criteria he
should apply in assessing their arguments. It will not do to read
either book as one would read the work of a disciplinary colleague.
Of the two authors, Amar comes closer to casting his story in the
recognizable mold of a work of history. The Bill of Rights has a
simple linear framework and a straightforward causal explanation of
how the transformation in the understanding of the Bill of Rights
came about. But at crucial points-perhaps most notably in staking a
starting position about the original meaning of the Bill of Rights-
Amar relies more on text than texture; more on a refined reading of
the language of the amendments than upon a close, documented
reconstruction of the motives and concerns of their authors.
Ackerman, for his part, has so many ends to pursue in his
ambitious We the People project that no account of the contents of
Transformations (its second volume) can quite do justice to its
structure. It is, in part, an essay in historical revisionism, insofar as it
reminds readers (professional historians included) that the
extraordinary constitutional developments of 1866-68 and 1935-37
represented momentous chapters in the dramas of Reconstruction
and the New Deal.' For intramural readers within the legal academy,
it challenges "hypertextualist" and "hyperformalist" models of
constitutional history, which insist both that Lochner-era
jurisprudence was a heretical deviation from the true path first
surveyed by the Marshall Court and then regained by the post-1937
New Deal Court, and that truly fundamental constitutional change
occurs only through Article V processes. This challenge in turn
makes We the People an exercise in constitutional theory, for in
emphasizing the agency of popular sovereignty in legitimating the
transformative moments of 1787, 1866, and 1937, Ackerman seeks to
convert that crucial concept from legal fiction into (occasionally)
operative practice.6  Finally, Ackerman's evocation of popular
5. See his comments on the decline of historians' interest in the genuine constitutional
problems that Reconstruction posed. While not unsympathetic to the concerns of more recent
scholars, Ackerman implies that some of the older historians whose works are now discredited
for their Southern and even racist biases, nonetheless better confronted the problems of
legality posed by Reconstruction. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 116-19 (1998).
6. For the idea that popular sovereignty truly is a legal fiction, albeit a useful one, see
EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988).
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sovereignty also takes the form of an appeal to the citizenry to be
prepared to exercise their sovereignty again-though not quite as
freely as Amar the spontaneous plebiscitarian would recommend.7
Rather, Ackerman closes this second volume of his projected trilogy
by proposing to replace (or complement?) Article V with a Popular
Sovereignty Initiative under which a second-term president could
initiate constitutional change by submitting a suitable proposal for
approval-first by the prescribed two-thirds vote of each house of
Congress and then by the people at two successive presidential
elections, after which "it should be accorded constitutional status by
the Supreme Court."8 And all this is couched in a rhetorical style
that is so colloquial and conversational as to border on vulgarity-at
least by the prissy and admittedly formal standards of literary
propriety to which most historians still adhere.'
James Madison once observed of Thomas Jefferson that
"[a]llowance also ought to be made for a habit in Mr. Jefferson as in
others of great genius of expressing in strong and round terms,
impressions of the moment."1 Without quite confusing or equating
those two leading original theorists of American constitutionalism"
with their latter-day avatars, 2 a similar allowance might be made for
7. See Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside
Article V, 55 U. CH. L. REV. 1043 (1988).
8. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 414-16. This procedure does not correspond very well to
Ackerman's conception of historical constitutional moments, which typically take thirty
months or less to run their course.
9. I freely confess to being one of those readers who does not relish being treated as the
immediate and continuous object of a conversation (admittedly one-sided) with an author. The
experience of reading Ackerman, however, is far more pleasant than that of reading another
once celebrated legal scholar, William Crosskey, whose hectoring tone in his two-volume
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953) often
made me feel as if I should shower after every chapter.
10. Letter from James Madison to Nicholas Trist (May 1832), in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 479 (G. Hunt ed., 1910).
11. Jefferson's initial contributions to American constitutional theory-as distinguished
from either his later doctrines of constitutional interpretation or his contributions to political
theory-deserve more consideration. A promising start has certainly been made by Donald
Mayer. See DONALD N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
(1994). Jefferson's concern with the problem of distinguishing a constitution from other forms
of legislation helped drive a critical evolution in constitutional theory after 1776; and, as I
argue elsewhere, Ackerman's failure to address this question fully poses a problem for his
treatment of the "illegality" of the Constitution. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 94-130 (1996) [hereinafter
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS]; Jack N. Rakove, The Super-legality of the Constitution, Or,
A Federalist Critique of Ackerman's Neo-Federalism, 108 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 1999)
[hereinafter Rakove, Super-legality]. Equally interesting, apropos of Amar, is Jefferson's early
realization that articles affirming rights should be incorporated in the main text of a
constitution, rather than presented in the form of a freestanding declaration of rights of
uncertain legal authority. See JACK N. RAKOVE, DECLARING RIGHTS: A BRIEF HISTORY
WiTH DOCUMENTS 75-81 (1997) (discussing and reprinting the fourth, rights-based article of
Jefferson's draft constitution for Virginia, 1776).
12. Ruminating on a work by the great Progressive historian, Carl Becker, I have often
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the rhetorical conceits of legal writing. While the conventions of
legal scholarship need not and often do not mirror the conventions
of legal argument, one sometimes has the impression that the realms
of academic and professional writing do overlap in significant ways.
Legal academic writing does seem to be more persuasive and
polemical in its rhetoric and more pronounced and robust in its
conclusions, characteristics which must reflect, whether directly or
indirectly, professional norms of adversarial advocacy, and perhaps
the hard-wiring of the legal mind. A historian's fondness for nuance,
understatement, texture, and even irony-much less an acceptance
of ambiguity-is not what one would expect of most legal writing,
and there is no point holding the latter to the aesthetic preferences
of the former. Nor is it certain that either author cares all that deeply
about the original intentions of the historical actors (with the
noteworthy exception of Amar's homage to Bingham). As
Ackerman observes of the "equivocal" nature of the "evidence"
attesting to the celebrated interpretative switches of Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes and Justice Owen Roberts in 1937: "I could
not care less. I am not interested in the hidden wellsprings of their
private motives, but in the public meaning of their constitutional
actions."" It is difficult to imagine a historian making quite the same
claim.
Yet some measure of accountability to historians' norms can be
expected when arguments about what actually happened in the past
form an essential foundation for the transformative stories our tag-
team wants to tell. To this problem I now turn.
Amar posing the less complicated case, we shall start there. As
already noted, the central argument of The Bill of Rights is
straightforward and linear, though the commentary offered en route
is replete with the nuance and discrimination that his audience might
expect.
All historical narratives begin with a starting point that must
always be arbitrary to one degree or another. We agonize a great
deal over exactly which starting point is either most appropriate or at
least good enough;'4 and sometimes, like good journalists, we cast
admired the capacity of modem constitutional legal scholars to pose as Everyperson Her/His
Own Theorist. It must be a wonderful feeling. See generally CARL BECKER, EVERYMAN HIS
OwN HISTORIAN (1935).
13. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 343.
14. Thus, in writing a history of the Continental Congress, I could have pushed the starting
point back to antecedents such as the Albany Congress of 1754 or the Stamp Act Congress of
1999]
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about for the "hook" of a telling vignette with which to sink the
larger (analytical) tale into the consciousness of the reader. 5 For
Amar, the necessary point of departure is less historical than
historiographical. That is, he wants to challenge the strongly
nationalist interpretation of the meaning of the Bill of Rights that
flows naturally from living in an incorporated world where vigorous
federal enforcement of its protections against the states is taken for
granted as the steady-state condition of constitutionalism. In his
opening chapter, Amar pursues this challenge by using the first two
of the original twelve amendments that Congress proposed in
September 1789 to confirm his underlying thesis that the controlling
animus of the Bill of Rights was strongly anti-national. The first of
these amendments (poorly drafted and never ratified) would have
tinkered further with the formula for apportioning representation
among the states; 6 the second, only recently ratified and now happily
enshrined, to the wonderment of all, as the Twenty-seventh
Amendment, prohibits the implementation of congressional pay
raises until a fresh election of representatives has occurred. 7 Despite
the failure of the states to ratify either article, their presence in the
package of the twelve proposed amendments suggests that a desire
to assuage lingering Anti-Federalist anxieties about the adequacy of
national representation provided a dominant motif for the Bill of
Rights more generally.
To appreciate the import of this move, consider the alternative
standard openings that Amar does not choose. He has little to say
about the politics of the ratification struggle, or the hoary question of
1765; but in part for reasons of economy, and in part because it posed the more immediate
political problem that the calling of the First Continental Congress of 1774 was meant to
overcome, it seemed to make more sense to begin with the collapse of the non-importation
movement of 1768-1770. See JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS:
AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 3-20 (1979).
15. Thus Bernard Bailyn opens his biography of Thomas Hutchinson, the royal governor
who presided over the collapse of imperial authority in Massachusetts, with the poignantly
ironic image of Hutchinson receiving an honorary degree from Oxford University on July 4,
1776. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORDEAL OF THOMAS HUTCHINSON 1 (1974).
16. As a strong textualist, Amar relishes noting the "technical glitches" created by the
wording of the original (as proposed) First Amendment. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 15.
17. Amar professes agnosticism on the validity of a ratification process that allowed the
original Second (now Twenty-seventh) Amendment to circulate in constitutional limbo-space
for two centuries before securing ratification. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 17 n*. Ackerman
pulls no punches, not counting himself among those misguided souls "who have the impression
that a twenty seventh amendment was enacted in 1992." See ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 490-
91 n.1. One would suspect, though, that the deluded would include all the state legislators who
rushed to ratify the amendment, most members of Congress and their constituents, and any
Supreme Court that might have to adjudicate a challenge to it in future years-not that such a
challenge seems likely to occur. The next amendment ratified will be numbered twenty-eight,
and any Ackermendments adopted under the Popular Sovereignty Initiative would follow the
same numerology.
6
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss1/5
Rakove
whether or not Madison's decision to make the cause of amendments
his own amounted to a campaign conversion, a genuine change of
heart owing something to Jefferson's admonitions (some delivered in
"strong and round terms"), or a calculated decision to reach out to
moderate Anti-Federalists to preempt any possibility of a second
constitutional convention. If Madison's theory of rights was distinctly
liberal and minoritarian-as it certainly was-Amar does not
attempt to explain whence this departure from conventional thinking
originated. Nor does he address the intriguing question of how
thinking about the juridical nature and authority of bills of rights
might have evolved since their first promulgation accompanying
some of the state constitutions of 1776, to which they stood in a
somewhat problematic relation. There is a fairly significant scholarly
literature on these questions, 8 but save for a few passing references,
Amar shortly shrifts it.
This may sound like sour, ego-damaged grapes on the part of a
reviewer who has spent some time and labor reflecting on these
questions and not infrequently recycling his answers to them. After
all, Jack (I might say, in imitation of Bruce),19 don't you owe Akhil
more credit for using the amendments that were not adopted to offer
a fresh perspective on the integrity and coherence of the remaining
ten? Indeed I do-but it is more important to identify the mode of
analysis that is at work here from the outset. For Amar, the meaning
of the Bill of Rights is to be derived primarily from close textual and
structural analysis, informed by a general but less-than-conclusively
demonstrated stipulation about the essential thrust of the
amendments. Once Amar moves beyond the failed amendments to
examine the articles that were ratified, his judgments rest primarily
on matters of text and structure, with excerpts from constitutional
debate or relevant cases (both prior English cases and subsequent
American ones) summoned for illustration. But the argument
remains more deductive than empirical; more a proof of how to read
the amendments, if one accepts the essential premise that they were
designed for the greater security of federalism, than an account
firmly grounded on documentary evidence of the original intentions
of framers or the understandings of ratifiers.
18. See, e.g., DONALD S. LUTZ, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG
POLITICAL THEORY IN THE EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS 59-71 (1980); GORDON S. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 268-73 (1969); James H. Hutson,
The Bill of Rights and the American Revolutionary Experience, in A CULTURE OF RIGHTS:
THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND LAW-1791 AND 1991, at 62 (M. Lacey
& K. Haakonssen eds., 1991); Jack N. Rakove, Parchment Barriers and the Politics of Rights, in
CULTURE OF RIGHTS, supra, at 98.
19. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 116.
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What resonates most for Amar is the recurrence of the word
people throughout the Bill of Rights and the understanding of
federalism it supports. In five succeeding chapters, Amar strolls
(admittedly briskly) through the adopted amendments, consistently
emphasizing how they should be read not as stringent efforts to
assert principles and rules protective of the rights of individuals and
minorities (the dominant modern as well as Madisonian reading),
but rather as a sustained attempt to counter one dangerous
(national) form of majoritarianism in the interest of supporting
another (state-based). Amar thus gives a new twist to the classic
counter-majoritarian dilemma beloved of Yale constitutional theory:
In its original incarnation of 1789, counter-majoritarianism was
directed against putatively dangerous national legislative majorities
on behalf of current or future state majorities. The Free Press,
Speech, Assembly, and Petition clauses of the First Amendment
were designed to prevent a self-serving national legislature from
enhancing its own power. Similarly, the Establishment Clause is
"agnostic" on the matter of what form of support a state could give
to the church(es) to which it accorded special recognition of a
traditional sort. The people of the Second Amendment are close
cousins-nay, fraternal housemates-of the people in the First,
keeping the arms they might one day need to bear against an abusive
national government after their peaceful assemblies and petitions
had presumably failed. So, too, the restrictions on the coercive power
of the national government provided in the more legalistic
amendments were designed not merely to protect individuals in the
exercise of basic liberties, but rather to ensure that juries (grand and
petit) would remain powerfully democratic and localist institutions,
thereby again checking the abuse of national power.
Some of these points are quite compelling-especially much of
what Amar says about the role of juries and the educative functions
of statements of rights, which I especially like because they parallel
my own analysis.2 ° Given his known interest in the law of criminal
procedure, it is not surprising that Amar urges readers to grasp the
prevalent eighteenth-century notion of the essential role of the jury
in protecting not merely the rights of the accused (or of defendants
in civil litigation) but the very fabric of constitutional government. In
that conception, jury service was arguably a higher badge of
citizenship-and certainly a more important function-than the
exercise of suffrage. But some of Amar's inferences seem more
problematic. The idea that the protective function of juries might
20. See RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 11, at 291-303.
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extend to resolving matters of constitutionality seems a stretch for a
textualist who should recall that the Supremacy Clause is addressed
explicitly to state judges, not juries, and implicitly to the federal
bench. How does one square the 1789 affirmations of the essential
role of juries with the ambition of Article III to enable the federal
judiciary to act, too, as an "inestimable bulwark" of liberty? So, too,
one wonders about the depth of textual massaging needed to support
Amar's whimsical suggestion that a contemporary reading of the
Second Amendment might protect the peoples' right to be "'armed'
with modems more than muskets, with access to the Internet more
than to the shooting range," because, "[a]s recent events in Russia
and China have shown, fax machines are perhaps the most powerful
weapons of all."21 (Not at Tiananmen Square, it would seem.)
But an analysis that relies so heavily on inferences from text and
structure leaves the historian more nervous in other respects. To
read the Bill of Rights as closely and ingeniously as Amar does
requires high confidence that all of its clauses were drafted with
scrupulous precision and a close attention to the echoes and
resonances among the clauses that Amar's sensitive ear detects.
Perhaps lawyers must read certain legal texts in just this way. Yet if
circumstances strongly suggest that the texts in question were not
crafted and drafted with quite the attention to symmetry and holistic
fit that Amar's textualism presupposes, how can we assume that
linguistic resonances offer the dominant key to interpretation? The
very notion that the Bill of Rights was framed with partly educative
purposes in mind-or even that its framers could not be certain of
the extent to which its statements would act as positive commands-
suggest that some caution is in order about Amarguments that rely
so much on language and structure to produce fine-tuned meanings.
Historians are less constrained by the need to find consistency;
ambiguity and incompletion work just as well for us, and we have no
stake in requiring every contradiction, tension, or oversight to be
resolved. When we reconstruct the circumstances surrounding the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, all kinds of reasons emerge to raise
questions about how much weight the exact choice of language can
be made to bear.
On the one hand, we certainly cannot ignore the evidence that its
21. AMAR, supra note 2, at 49-50. From the right to bear arms, Amar seems to move to the
question: With what resources must the modem citizen be armed? On that basis, the original
Second Amendment was poorly drafted because it failed to protect the right to bear quills
along with the right to kill bears (with something heavier than quills). To be fair, Amar's
linkage of First and Second Amendments might do the work here; but in that case, wouldn't
the Second be redundant? I would think that a textualist would locate the fight to log on as an
aspect of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition.
1999]
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framers were aware of linguistic nuance. Madison's substitution of
the mandatory "shall" for the monitory "ought" that was typical of
most American bills of rights prior to 1789 is one critical point on
that head. And the various versions of the Establishment Clause as it
made its way from Madison's proposals to the House floor to the
Senate and then into the joint conference committee obviously bear
scrutiny.
Yet other circumstances warrant greater caution. Editorial care
notwithstanding, the Bill of Rights retained something of the earlier
notion that such declarations simply recognized truths that rested on
some prior foundation-the laws of nature or its God, custom since
time immemorial, or the Lockean recognition that freedom of
conscience was indeed a natural right because true belief can never
be coerced. Or again, modern agonizing over the exact text of the
Second Amendment may seem a bit beside the point if all it was
meant to do was to remind future congresses-at a time when few
Americans were well armed -that supporting the militia was a good
idea.2 Anyone who reads through the debates of the First Federal
Congress will find it hard to resist concluding that the amendments
were drafted in a relatively casual way, with many members palpably
feeling that Madison was wasting their time by insisting that they
pursue a project they deemed politically unnecessary.23 In that case,
more attention to Madison's wise-before-his-time liberal
understanding of the problem of rights might still be in order.
But Amar, like Ackerman, is not really interested in documenting
intentions-at least as I understand the process. At this point in his
narrative, text and structure suffice to establish the baseline from
which the transformations of 1866 may be plotted. Given that the
corpus of Bill of Rights jurisprudence remained so slim throughout
the nineteenth century, the heavy lifting of his historical argument
need never have taken place there in any case. We know from many
other sources that respect for federalism was a dominant value of
early nineteenth-century and antebellum constitutionalism. And
given the low, not to say miniscule, level of national governance in
22. As the soon-to-be-published research of Michael Bellesiles will demonstrate, many
American households did not contain firearms in the eighteenth century, and few households
would have possessed the kind of weapons that you would carry into battle against British
regulars. Grandpa's seventeenth-century fowling piece would not quite do the trick. The same
situation existed when the Civil War erupted in 1861. One could therefore read the Second
Amendment as an injunction to Congress to support the local militia. See Michael Bellesiles,
The Origins of Gun Culture in the United States, 1760-1865,83 J. AM. HIST. 425 (1996).
23. The debates can be found in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS (Neil Cogan ed., 1998);
and 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS (Charlene Bangs
Bickford ed., 1992).
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an era when the United States government remained "a midget
institution in a giant land,"'2 the desuetude of every article of the Bill
of Rights other than the Tenth Amendment is completely
unsurprising.
Thus, the establishment of an explicitly causal dimension to
Amar's explanation of the transformation of the meaning of the Bill
of Rights must await Part II of the book, which is devoted to
Reconstruction and the framing of Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Here the context is set less by Dred Scott v. Sandford25
and its denial of black citizenship than by Barron v. Baltimore,26
which in Amar's account accurately represented the original
understanding that federalism was the dominant value the
amendments of 1789 were conceived to protect. John Bingham, the
principal framer of Section One, here appears as a Barron-contrarian
who had long since realized that the Marshall Court's refusal to
shelter the protection of individual rights under the banner of the
Bill of Rights was wrong, if not in history, then at least in impact. To
Bingham and other Republicans, the defense of federalism no longer
made sense -at least if that defense would empower unrepentant ex-
Confederate majorities to use the restoration of legal governments to
impose upon their former bondspeople a regime of Black Codes
backed by cruel and vicious terror. The conflict between majorities
and minorities that Madison had once theorized so abstractly-or
fretted about excessively in terms of rights of property holders and
religious dissenters-had now assumed a vivid form.27 In 1866 the
imperative was to extend constitutional protection to the freed slaves
so as to enable them to escape the rights-denying legislation they
would otherwise encounter. Federalism was no longer the solution to
the problem of protecting rights but the problem itself.
In sustaining this argument, Amar gives equal weight to textual
and historical considerations in a way that seems superior to his
approach to the framing of the Bill of Rights. With Barron as a point
of departure and parallel chapters on "Text" and "History"
examining the original meaning of the Section One clauses on
citizenship and privileges and immunities, Part II has a clear causal
24. I borrow this phrase from John Murrin, The Great Inversion, or Court versus Country:
A Comparison of the Revolution Settlements in England (1688-1721) and America (1776-1816),
in THREE BRITISH REVOLUTIONS: 1641, 1688, 1776, at 368 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1980).
25. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
26. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
27. Yet it is worth noting that Madison understood that the oppression of African-
American slaves was a paradigmatic form of majority tyranny so severe as to call into question
whether slave societies could ever be truly republican. See RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS,
supra note 11, at 337.
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framework that Part I lacks. As a textualist, Amar relishes the fact
that Section One speaks of "persons" and "citizens" who individually
possess and exercise "privileges and immunities" that are
interchangeable with rights and freedoms. That collective entity of
the people has disappeared. As a historian, tracing something
developing over time, he equally relishes the opportunity to array
evidence that the repudiation of Barron was an essential purpose of
the Amendment's framers. Following the earlier research of Michael
Kent Curtis," Amar persuasively argues that the leading framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment clearly understood that the "privileges
and immunities" it would protect subsumed the fundamental
protections of the original Bill of Rights. If contemporary debates
failed to document this consensus adequately, that was not because
such agreement did not exist, but rather because it was both taken
for granted and less controversial than other sections of the
Amendment. 9
At both poles of his historical argument, Amar thus offers
unequivocal accounts of dominant, paradigmatic understandings of
the essential nature and desired application of the Bill of Rights. The
story line is transparent: There is a clear starting point and an equally
clear conclusion, and if Amar is correct to identify Barron-
contrarianism as the connective mechanism between the two,
energized by the circumstances of 1865-66, we have an
extraordinarily elegant explanation of how and why the
transformation occurred. In many ways, it fits almost perfectly the
model of historical explanation I was taught in graduate school3 -
explaining a demonstrable change over time-and yet, a certain
something is missing. That something is perhaps best described as
texture, by which I mean a willingness to tolerate nuance and
ambiguity and to provide the measure of descriptive detail that gives
historical narrative its veracity. For the study of both the Founding
and Reconstruction-or any period of intense political
argumentation-texture may also require a willingness to understand
that conflicting and inconsistent ideas not only exist concurrently
(which is obvious) but may even coalesce and collaborate to muddy
the consequences of any attempt to reach consensus on points of
political discussion and constitutional doctrine. That was one of the
brilliant features of Gordon Wood's seminal study of the origins of
28. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986).
29. For a discussion of this point, see AMAR, supra note 2, at 197-206.
30. For brief reflections, see Jack N. Rakove, Encountering Bernard Bailyn, 19
HUMANITIES 9, 9-10 (1998).
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American constitutionalism. Its primary achievement was not to
recover a language or discourse of republicanism, but rather to
capture the complexity and the simultaneously retrospective and
progressive dimensions of American political thinking.3 That is also
the strength, I think, of a recent book that Amar and Ackerman both
curiously neglect: William Nelson's account of the drafting of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which explains how ambiguities inherent in
the structure of mid-nineteenth-century thinking about rights,
equality, and federalism created the conditions that virtually
required a course of judicial interpretation to transform abstract and
generally formulated principles into workable constitutional
doctrine.32 Amar husbands his sense of nuance not for historical
reconstruction but for the theory of "refined incorporation" that
offers the doctrinal payoff of his book-a theory I am professionally
incompetent to judge, but that seems to offer a sophisticated method
of ascertaining the basis on which individual provisions of the Bill of
Rights may or may not be applied against the states.
Bruce Ackerman is far more interested in processes of historical
change than is his colleague Amar. Indeed, he devotes the historical
sections of Transformations to elaborating a model of transformative
constitutional change that covers the three Ackermoments of the
Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal. This raises an
immediate and fundamental question about the nature of the
enterprise. For historians, truth be told, are not model-builders,33 and
no conventional constitutional historian would ever dream of
developing a general theory of transformation capable of subsuming
three such disparate events under one heading. In many ways (at
least at first glance), Ackerman's project, though about history,
resembles a conventional if weak form of political science (his other
discipline). On the other hand, historians may be model-users; that
31. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787
(1969).
32. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 13-39, 64-90 (1988). Amar has suggested (in a somewhat
frenetic recent conversation in New Haven, when I was dashing to my car) that he simply finds
Nelson's account unpersuasive, but I would have preferred to see its claims addressed
forthrightly.
33. This claim is probably overstated and is doubtless subject to qualification. Certainly
that group of scholars who classify themselves as social science historians (primarily interested
in economic history) would have theory-building pretensions; so do comparative historians
who study subjects like the rise of slave societies. Yet most historical scholarship remains so
focused on one time and place that the idea of elaborating general theories, as opposed to
interpretations of particular events, still seems to lie beyond the discipline's essential purpose.
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is, they may embrace a model developed in other disciplines if it
helps them to make sense of the particular phenomenon (a set of
events unfolding in a locale among identifiable actors at a defined
moment of time) they are studying. The practical value of
Ackerman's project would thus seem to lie in its capacity to afford a
fresh view of familiar events by delineating a sequence of stages
through which such transformations unfold.
The Ackermodel involves a number of propositions. The starting
point is the view that the three critical episodes-and an
Ackermoment is a compressed episode-cannot be described in
either hyperformal or hypertextual terms as changes effectuated
within the known parameters of the existing constitutional regime.
All were "unconventional" in their circumvention of prevailing
norms and rules; all depended on a measure of political
entrepreneurship that risked defying these conventions to pursue the
justifiable changes sought. Yet all stopped well short of the truly
revolutionary upheavals that we have witnessed in the two centuries
since our own Founding, which have brought much-told grief to so
many millions. Ackerman is a sympathetic (though not uncritical)
reader of Hannah Arendt's insistence that the creation of
permanent, freedom-enhancing constitutional regimes on the
American model offers an expression of the revolutionary impulse
superior to the other experiments carried out (ostensibly in the name
of the people) by the other revolutionary tradition, which traces its
origins to the radical Jacobinry of the Terror. 4 What redeems the
great American constitutional reform movements from the taint of
sedition is that their success depended on securing the assent and
consent of institutions, acting outside the boundaries of strict
legality, yet providing the requisite legitimacy to carry the desired
transformations through to victory. Reduced to its crudest form,
political success in winning institutional and popular endorsement
for reform provides the legitimacy that trumps immediate illegality
while establishing long-term legality.
But a crude model cannot be very useful. Ackerman instead
proposes a five-stage process that he first detects operating in the
Federalist movement of the 1780s. The process begins with Signaling,
in which a reform movement indicates its intention to earn
34. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 204-12 (1991) (discussing
HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 13-52 (1963)). It is a bizarre irony that the French
translation of We the People goes under the title Au Nom du Peuple (in the name of the
People), apparently because the original American phrase simply does not translate well into
French. (Maybe that's their problem.) Ackerman shared this anecdote with participants at the
recent Yale Law Journal symposium on his project.
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"sufficient authority to challenge the status quo." 5 Then follow two
closely linked but discrete stages of the Proposal and Triggering
Functions,36 which involve demonstrating a more concrete intention
to replace the existing regime with another, and to seek "an entirely
new procedure for ratification" of the resulting change. Then comes
Ratification, which requires utilizing the new procedures to secure
actual approval for the desired change. Finally, there must be a
Consolidation of the change that goes beyond mere initial approval
to a lasting acceptance, so that no lingering doubts about the
legitimacy of what has transpired will persist to disrupt the
transformation. Cumulatively, the whole process produces a
bandwagon effect, in which success at each stage creates additional
incentives to accede to the legitimacy of the process even if doubts
about its legality persist. 7
How well does this model describe the process of constitutional
formation that unfolded from roughly 1785 to 1789? The three
middle stages seem relatively uncontroversial, but the initial and
concluding phases that bracket them are more problematic.
Ackerman implies that the Federalist movement had acquired at
least a latent coherence-but presumably rather more-by 1786,
when "Madison & Co." were ready to abandon Article XIII
procedures for amending the Confederation,3" as the maneuvers
leading first to the calling of the Annapolis Convention and then its
proposal of a general convention to assemble in Philadelphia in May
1787 attest. This account smoothes over a fair number of rough spots
in the actual politics of 1786, not least of which is the absence of any
firm evidence of the nature of the constitutional changes that even
ambitious reformers-like Madison and Hamilton, both present at
Annapolis-would have sought. A better (or more detailed) case
could be made that the call that issued from Annapolis in September
1786 was driven more by a desperate sense that all other alternatives
had been exhausted than by any coherent notion of what form a
reconstituted Union might take or the exact agenda that reformers
should pursue. That much speculation was taking place about the
possible content of constitutional reform is evident: "It is therefore
not uncommon to hear the principles of Government stated in
common Conversation," wrote one Massachusetts delegate to
Congress. "Emperors, Kings, Stadtholders, Governors General, with
35. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 40.
36. See id. at 49.
37. See id. at 40-68.
38. Article XIII required that all amendments to the Articles of Confederation be
proposed by Congress and then ratified by all thirteen state legislatures.
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a Senate, or House of Lords, & House of Commons, are frequently
the Topics of Conversation."39 But these conversations, however
frequent or numerous, lacked a focal point. Whatever "signaling"
was going on in this period could have conveyed few firm
impressions of the course the Federal Convention would take; as in
other forms of intelligence gathering, discerning the true "signal"
from surrounding "noise" would have been quite tricky. Even
Madison, perhaps the premier agenda-control maven of his age, only
began drafting his agenda for the Convention in the weeks
immediately preceding its scheduled opening-which nearly all the
delegates missed by the better part of a fortnight." Nor could it have
been evident-the anomalies apparent in the calling of the
convention notwithstanding-that it would substitute an entirely new
mode of ratification for the existing rules of the Confederation.
So, too, one can quarrel with Ackerman's account of the final
consolidation phase of the process. Perhaps a conversation or two
with Amar" might have convinced Ackerman to ask what role the
adoption of the Bill of Rights played in confirming the authority and
legitimacy of the Constitution. Instead, Ackerman's brief account
exaggerates the importance of bringing the two holdout states, North
Carolina and Rhode Island, into the reconstituted Union. Without
them, the new Congress remained "a secessionist body""2-and so
too must have been the Thirty-ninth Convention Congress of 1866
while it refused to reseat the South. "Unless and until the dissenters
got on the bandwagon, the problematic legality of the new regime
would be a matter of open and endless contestation."" But there is
simply little evidence in the well-documented history of the First
Federal Congress to suggest that its members found the holdout
issue very troubling; what is more intriguing is the way in which the
holdout North Carolina Anti-Federalists tried to imagine how their
state might remain in the Union, even if not actively participating in
its government. For all intents and purposes, consolidation was
completed with the first federal elections of 1789."
39. Letter from Samuel Osgood to John Adams (Nov. 14, 1786) (on file with the
Massachusetts Historical Society, Adams Family Papers, microfilm reel 368), quoted in JACK
RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 387 (1979).
40. See RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 11, at 42-56.
41. In my limited experience, one should do the trick.
42. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 64-65.
43. Id.
44. There are other problems with Ackerman's account of the Founding, which I will
discuss in a concurrent essay being published by another New Haven legal journal. Foremost
among these is the emphasis on what Ackerman calls the "flagrant illegality" of the
Constitution, a claim that ignores the critical doctrinal developments in the American
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Determining exactly how well the five-stage "bandwagon" model
applies to the other two episodes may perhaps best be left to
specialists for other periods.45 There the greater difficulty may not be
whether the five stages fit, but how well Ackerman can convert the
critical congressional elections of 1866 and 1936 into explicit,
conscious, and focused mandates for constitutional transformation,
as opposed to all the other sorts of preferences that might have come
into play. That the victorious Republican and Democratic parties in
those respective elections might plausibly claim to have received a
decisive (or at least sufficient) mandate for their constitutional
program is not surprising. But whether the electorate was truly
engaged in exercising its popular sovereignty is another matter
entirely, and skeptical readers with a political scientific bent may not
find enough evidence arrayed here to be persuaded. By contrast, in
the case of 1787-89 it seems much more plausible to infer that
elections to the ratification conventions and then to the First Federal
Congress can indeed be described as mandates on the Constitution.46
There are, however, other fundamental questions that a historian
can raise about Ackerman's model. Let us concede that it identifies
the three fundamental transformations in American constitutional
history. But is that equivalence in drama, stature, or impact sufficient
to group these three episodes together as one class of phenomena?
Ackerman's strongest answer to this reservation seems to rely on his
intramural engagement with the orthodox stories of constitutional
history told within the legal academy. Taking arms (and modems,
too, no doubt) against those shadowy bands of scholars who march
under the banners of hypertextualism and hyperformalism,
Ackerman repeatedly (and I do mean repeatedly) reminds readers
that only his bandwagon process of revolutionary reformers gaining
legitimacy by co-opting institutions to validate their "illegal
47
understanding of a constitution that had taken place during the decade since the first state
constitutions and the Articles of Confederation were drafted in the mid-1770s. There is a
curious irony here. In Transformations, Ackerman the legal theorist poses as a shrewd political
realist, which is the same characterization that it is fair to say my work has earned for me; yet
here I am claiming that Ackerman ignores or at least undervalues critical developments in
legal theory occurring before 1787. See Rakove, Superlegality, supra note 11.
45. On occasions like this, the historian's trusty and universal disclaimer- "That's after
(before) my period" -always comes in handy.
46. Notwithstanding the publication of a four-volume history, see DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS (Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1976-89), the
significance of these elections has not been carefully studied, with the exception of the short
monograph by Steven Boyd. See STEVEN R. BOYD, THE POLITICS OF OPPOSITION:
ANTIFEDERALISTS AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1979).
47. The concept of "extra-legality" employed by Pauline Maier to describe modes of
resistance to duly constituted authority before 1776 might be more appropriate than
"illegality," which to my mind suggests that the perpetrators should have been promptly locked
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initiatives describes the messy process by which our most basic
changes have been effectuated. Not being entirely sure how
numerous or resilient these shadowy hyper-types actually are, I
wonder why this exercise in Ackerpuncture needs to deploy so many
needles.
The more important objection, however, is that the disparity in the
essential character of the three episodes outweighs the similarity
they derive from their gross impact. Whether any general theory of
constitutional transformation can rest on either the Founding or
Reconstruction is surely open to question, because their
circumstances are so extraordinary as to verge on the truly unique.
In the case of the former, we are dealing with the establishment, not
only of the regime itself, but of the very concept of the regime-a
distinctive experiment in constitutional governance for which
contemporaries boastfully but justifiably felt no useful precedents
existed. In the case of Reconstruction, we confront the equally
distinctive case of the aftermath of a Civil War waged in defense of a
perpetual Union whose defenders now confronted the dispiriting
prospect of seeing the unrepentant rebellious states restore the
political status quo ante bellum, with the added perverse possibility of
the losers gaining additional representation for the freed slaves they
were already intent on disfranchising. What connects these events
with the New Deal, beyond their gross importance and Ackerman's
all-purpose model of transformation?
A greater difficulty lies in the nature of the transformation itself.
Are the transformations required to work out the constitutional
settlements of a Revolution and Civil War equivalent to the shifts in
judicial doctrine that accompanied the acceptance of the New Deal
state? Critics of Ackerman's treatment of the New Deal could
plausibly argue that it has to exaggerate the strength and coherence
of the Lochnerian legacy to give the jurisprudential developments of
1935-37 their transformative (as opposed to merely dramatic) power.
In a sense, Lochner plays the same role in the structure of
Ackerman's historical argument as Barron does for Amar. Yet the
body of doctrine that the Court inherited in the 1930s was arguably a
more complicated, tangled, and therefore manipulable set of
materials than those that controlled legal thinking during the middle
third of the previous century. Had the Court chosen to acquiesce in
the New Deal from the beginning, it had ready at hand the materials
up and prosecuted. See PAULINE MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION: COLONIAL
RADICALS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO BRITAIN 1765-1776, at 3-
48 (1972).
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needed to make its acceptance consistent with existing strands of
constitutional law.48
It is not, therefore, the deep similarities among the three episodes
that hold Ackerman's comparative project together. As either
historical explanation or a weak form of descriptive model-building,
the results presented would probably not justify the commitment and
even passion that Ackerman has invested in this project. Why, then,
does he work as hard as he does to link the three moments together?
The answer, I believe, is that the constitutional entrepreneurship of
1787 and 1866 helps to legitimate the New Deal's radical and
permanent departure from established doctrine; and that the latter's
accomplishment, occurring under conditions of democratization
substantially greater than participants in the earlier events could
have imagined, much less attained, in turn legitimates Ackerman's
call to the citizenry to be prepared to mobilize for the next full-
blown crisis that must appear. Ackerman's model, in short, is linked
much more to its normative pretensions-its appeal for a form of
democratic citizenship concerned with more than ordinary politics-
than to its academic and analytical conventions. The trumpet sounds
at the very beginning of Transformations and again at the very end.
If Americans do not understand and recall the revolutionary
reformist acts that preserved the Constitution through its several
transformations, they will be condemned to become the prisoners of
the lower forms of lawmaking that represent not our politics at their
aspirational best, but the play of passion, interest, and mere opinion
that the Madisonian system was designed to control.
Historians do not cover their ears when trumpets sound, but
neither do they bolt from their studies (or what were known in the
eighteenth century as their "closets ' 49) at the first flourish. (Or as the
Talmudic expression would have it, if the Messiah comes when you
are planting a tree, first finish planting, then go out to greet him.) As
Gordon Wood has suggested, history may often have to serve an
inherently cautionary or even conservative role, offering not
promises of liberation but reminders of fallibility. "Unlike sociology,
political science, psychology, and the other social sciences"-let us
interject law-"which try to breed confidence in managing the
48. See Larry Kramer, What's a Constitution for Anyway? Of History and Theory, Bruce
Ackerman and the New Deal, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 885 (1996).
49. Explaining the difficulties the Convention faced, Madison asked: "Would it be
wonderful [i.e., surprising] if, under the pressure of all these difficulties, the convention should
have been forced into some deviations from that artificial structure and regular symmetry
which an abstract view of the subject might lead an ingenious theorist to bestow on a
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future, the discipline of history tends to inculcate skepticism about
people's ability to order their destinies at will," Wood writes
(apropos of Bernard Bailyn's sympathetic yet critical portrayal of
Thomas Hutchinson). "History that reveals the utter differentness
and discontinuity of the past tends to undermine that crude
instrumental and presentist use of the past that Americans especially
have been prone to [make]."5 By no means would I suggest that
Ackerman's use of the past is "crude[,] instrumental and presentist";
au contraire, I cannot imagine how a legal scholar with so many other
interests to pursue would remain beguiled by the past if he did not
find it intellectually alluring. Nor would I spend my own active
intellectual hours immersed in the founding era of the Republic
merely because it poses some neat puzzles to solve; anyone who
cares about the Constitution intellectually should also, I believe, care
about it politically. 1
Yet in the end, it is the normative connections that Ackerman
draws across these three episodes, more than the analytical model he
weaves from their disparate elements, that holds Transformations
together. The appeal to the first two episodes of Founding and
Reconstruction legitimates the third (New Deal) while illuminating
the failure of a potential (if highly problematic) fourth moment (the
failed Reaganaut reversal of constitutional doctrine in the 1980s);
and this linkage in turn sustains the possibilities for future
reformation that Ackerman wants to leave open, however elusive
and distant and unfathomable (like everything about the future)
those possibilities must remain.
It is here, then-in the polymorphous shuffling back and forth
among historical data, political-scientific model-building, a
normative theory of constitutional renewal, and the occasional bugle
call-that the historian must acknowledge the difficulty of
ascertaining the correct criteria by which We the People should
finally be judged. Diffidence is all the more in order when we have
only a glimmer of a notion of what the concluding volume of the
trilogy, Interpretations, will look like. But an interim problem that
the final volume might presumably address can at least be broached:
It inheres in the adequacy of Ackerman's working definition of
50. Gordon S. Wood, The Creative Imagination of Bernard Bailyn, in THE
TRANSFORMATION OF EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: SOCIETY, AUTHORITY, AND IDEOLOGY
46 (James Henretta et al. eds., 1991). This is not the first time I have quoted this passage in
conjunction with contemplating the thoughts of Bruce Ackerman. See Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity
Through History- (Or to It) 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1605-06 & n.58 (1997).
51. This does not mean, however, that we must care about it uncritically, as if our only
mission in its interpretation is to purvey its timeless truths to students, readers, and the public
more generally.
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constitutional moments to capture the main lines of development
that any satisfactory theory of American constitutional history must
explore. For Ackerman, a constitutional moment is just that: an
episode occurring within a highly compressed span of time. The
question is, does this implied definition overdramatize and
oversimplify processes that cannot be segmented quite so tidily?
I come to this review from the recent experience of having taught a
new lecture course in constitutional history that carried me past my
usual seventeenth- and eighteenth-century haunts. The subject was
the Constitution and race, and its conception (in both senses) was
consciously if loosely inspired by Ackerman's notion of moments, in
that it was designed to emphasize three distinct and bounded periods
(or episodes) when the two subjects were most closely intertwined:
the Founding, the era of Civil War and Reconstruction, and the
Second Reconstruction which began, more or less, with Brown v.
Board of Education and reached a climax, of sorts, with the civil
rights legislation of 1964-65. One can already see that a working
historian's definition of a moment is naturally more extended than
Ackerman's; but, equally important, in designing and teaching the
course, I inevitably found myself doing a great deal of backing and
filling to provide more context for the highest or most dramatic
moments of constitutional decision-making. Inevitably, the
historian's natural impulse to contextualize ever more, and not to be
(too) arbitrary in segmenting the episodes under study, led me to
wonder about the adequacy of Ackerman's chronological
framework, with its quite narrow delineation.
But the deeper criticism arises from Ackerman's decision
(explained in Foundations) to relegate Brown and its legacy to a
secondary position where it is treated more as an extension (or
synthesis) of the New Deal transformation than an independent
development of equal status. This treatment, if I understand it
correctly, inheres in Ackerman's understanding that "the Supreme
Court's decisions in Brown and Griswold did not come at moments
when a mobilized citizenry was demanding a fundamental change in
our fundamental law."52 It is certainly reasonable to claim that the
Supreme Court was acting in advance of any conclusive political
mandate in 1954. Nor was the Court resisting bold new initiatives in
the way that it, in Ackerman's account, was justified in doing in the
mid-1930s, until the New Deal had demonstrated its staying power
by mustering the commanding voice of We the People at the polls in
1936. But so what? By any measure, the question of why the Second
52. ACKERMAN, supra note 34, at 131-62 (quotation at 133).
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Reconstruction succeeded where the original Reconstruction failed
would seem to bring the two episodes into equivalence-and rather
more naturally than, say, comparing the New Deal with the
Founding. For Ackerman, the problem seems to be that unfolding
the legacy of Brown would require a very different model of the
stages by which the process of transformation operates. Here it is the
Supreme Court that first does the signaling, the states of the South
that do the resisting, the people out-of-doors who do the mobilizing,
and the political branches of the executive and presidency that
eventually fall into line, after demonstrating substantial inertia of
their own. The sequence is entirely out of whack with Ackerman's
bandwagon model, but that may identify a fault with the model
rather than an assessment of the gross impact of the changes
unleashed. For to characterize the changes in race relations in the
1950s and 1960s as less than transformative-or as merely synthetic
of the constitutional changes of the 1930s-seems a remarkably
stunted assessment of their impact on our politics and jurisprudence
alike.53
In short, whatever its formidable normative ambitions, the
question of how Ackerman defines and delimits constitutional
moments raises troubling questions about the historical Foundations
on which his Transformations and eagerly awaited Interpretations
rest.
To bring these two books into common focus for one conclusive
assessment is no easy task. They overlap at points, of course, in their
common interest in Reconstruction and, to a lesser extent, the
Founding. But Ackerman has nothing to say about the drafting of
the Bill of Rights, nor Amar about the New Deal. Amar is
preoccupied with constitutional text and rules for its interpretation;
Ackerman cares little for text, has surprisingly little to say about
judicial interpretation-at least so far-and is much more concerned
with the politics of constitutional transformation, which seems to
bore Amar. Ackerman develops a model of historical change that
covers events that historians might balk at comparing, yet that still
engages in an extremely insightful way with the twists and turns of
53. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL
VIOLENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH (1995); HUGH
DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL
POLICY, 1960-1972 (1990); Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The
Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994-95).
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the documentary record. Amar tells a story of change that better
conforms to the structure of a historical narrative, but that relies
primarily on legalistic arguments from text and structure.
Historians are not the most entrepreneurial of the various species
who earn their daily bread practicing the human sciences. To use the
late Sir Isaiah Berlin's famous metaphor, we almost always number
among the hedgehogs of intellectual life, not its foxes.54 We are
happy when we come to know one thing, or a very limited
neighborhood, quite well. Speaking as a hedgehog, I have always
found much to admire in the legal foxes who come tramping (or
occasionally trampling) through the neighborhood. Their fur is sleek,
they are charming companions, and one envies the ease with which
they move from field to field, hunting their prey. One learns a lot
from the fox, even though most of it cannot be easily applied. That
they manage to extract a few goodies from one's own plot is no
object of complaint; historians should be hard workers, and we're a
long way from exhausting our plots in any case.
It is the difficulty of grading the fox on any criteria other than
foxiness that makes the task of assessment difficult. The fox, that
clever cosmopolitan, makes us appreciate things we would otherwise
miss. Amar does this with a remarkably elegant argument that
sharply clarifies and illuminates the profound shift in rights-thinking
that took place between the eras of Madison and Bingham. And
whatever one makes of the boundaries of Ackerman's moments or
the neatness of his five-step transformative process, the
hyperorthodox narrative of American constitutional history will
never look the same again. Yet in these works history remains
something to be used, and indeed is valuable only insofar as it
remains useful. It is one mode of analysis to be followed so long as it
seems rewarding, but its own claims have no priority or special value.
The fox has too many other objects to pursue.




Rakove: Two Foxes in the Forest of History
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999
' THE CULTURAL LIFE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES
Authorship, Appropriation, and the LawQ ROSEMARY J. COOMBE
"A sparklingly original synthesis of cultural studies and law.
Coombe is a clever and edifying guide through the hidden
landscape of property rights that subtly shapes so many cul-
tural phenomena... . "-Bruce Robbins, Rutgers University
O"This is highly original ethnography. Coombe not only
shows us the lifeways of law, but also some fascinating rout-
ings between the streets and high theory, and back again.
... "-Carol J. Greenhouse, Indiana University,
LL "Coombe's own skills as anthropologist and lawyer have
been re-combined to devastating effect. 7-Marilyn Strathern,
~ University of Cambridge
456 pages, paper $19.95 Post-Contemporary Interventions
wZ THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON
PIERRE SCHLAG
Claiming that reason has been endowed with a virtually mys-
tical power to organize social life, Schlag unravels the seem-
ingly rational world of judicial opinions, statutes, doctrines,
and legal principles. He paints a shocking picture of the
chaos and, indeed, violence of the American legal tradition.
"Schlag is one of the most exciting and interesting legal theo-
rists now writing and this book shows all of his considerable
virtues."-James Boyle, Washington College of Law,
(2 American University
"This is an important contribution to the genre of jurispru-
dential reflection. It considers some of the most difficult and
sophisticated issues on the current intellectual scene and,
unlike much 'postmodern' scholarly production, it is clear,
0 well-argued, and often brilliantly written."-Gary Pellet,Georgetown University Law Center
176 pages, paper $17.95
L.
Also available
S AGAINST THE LAW
PAUL F. CAMPOS, PIERRE SCHLAG, AND STEVEN D. SMITH
W 1996. 288 pages, paper $19.95
Z
24
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss1/5
